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Abstract
In this article, the authors move away from approaching generations as static categories and 
explore how ordinary people, as opposed to scholars, distinguish generations and justify their 
different responses to cultural diversity in terms of ethnicity, race and religion/belief. The 
analysis draws on 90 in-depth interviews with 30 residents in the Polish capital, Warsaw (2012–
2013). Through approaching generation as an analytical category, the authors identify various 
differentiating narratives which the study participants employed to draw boundaries between 
generations, reinforcing the common belief that the youngest Poles are most accepting of 
diversity. Although generations are seen as the axis of difference, conditioning generation-specific 
responses to diversity, the accounts emerging from the interviews reveal their relational nature, 
as well as similarities and points of connection between their experiences.
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Introduction
Generations can be an important lens through which to understand struggles over the 
meanings and effects of large-scale processes of social change (Edmunds and Turner, 
2005), like those driven by immigration and related ethnic diversification of societies. 
Periods of such change have often been met with varying responses from people of dif-
ferent generations who were socialised in different times, and have differential stakes in 
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the past, present and future. Until recently, sociological research defining and describing 
generations has been predominantly based on the experiences of the Western democra-
cies (Bischoping and Gao, 2018; Vandegrift, 2016). In this article we focus on Poland – a 
society which has been undergoing ethnic diversification since 1989, when the process 
of transition into democracy started. This has been accompanied by secularisation and 
changes in behaviour and attitudes among the youngest cohorts due to growing up in a 
non-authoritarian regime (Requena and Stanek, 2013).
Despite an emerging interest in generation as a relational concept and the framework 
of intergenerationality (Hopkins and Pain, 2007; McDaniel et al., 2013; Vanderbeck and 
Worth, 2015), there has been relatively little research in sociological studies which has 
explored how ordinary people, as opposed to scholars, distinguish generations and what 
consequences such thinking might have (Foster, 2013b). Generations have been largely 
used in social sciences to identify age/birth cohorts that are believed to share some mean-
ingful experience in the past and therefore hold similar attitudes and values. Every few 
years new ‘boxed and labelled’ generations emerge (e.g. Millennials, also known as 
Generation Y), which become marketing tools or the basis for policy (Biggs, 2007; 
McDaniel, 2004). Yet, there has been little sociological inquiry devoted to how people 
make sense of generations and how they discursively construct them (Aboim and 
Vasconcelos, 2014; Bischoping and Gao, 2018; Foster, 2013b).
The aim of this article is to explore how people in Poland narratively create bounda-
ries between generations. We do so by analysing responses to cultural ‘otherness’ in 
terms of ethnicity, race and religion/belief. We consider these three axes of difference 
because, in the Polish context, whiteness and Catholic identity have historically been 
associated with national identity (Balogun, 2018; Borowik, 2002; Jaskułowski and 
Pawlak, 2020; Ząbek, 2007). Our intention is not to determine which generation is more 
or less prejudiced, but our research question relates to how people ascribing themselves 
to different generations perceive each other’s attitudes and behaviours, in relation to 
cultural difference, and how they justify those attitudes and behaviours. We draw on 90 
in-depth interviews with 30 residents of Warsaw, conducted as a part of the project: 
‘Living with Difference in Europe: Making Communities out of Strangers in an Era of 
Super Mobility and Super Diversity’ (2010–2014; see Mayblin et al., 2016). The research 
was completed on the eve of a downward shift in attitudes towards immigration and 
cultural difference in Poland (CBOS, 2018; Krzyżanowski, 2018). The narratives from 
the interviews reveal a common belief that the generation that grew up before 1989 (but 
after the Second World War) is less accepting of difference, because of being socialised 
in times of normative control, higher religiosity and no visible diversity. We unpack 
these narratives, demonstrating revealing contradictions and complexities.
Background
The Polish case
Unlike most Western European societies, Poland has not taken a linear path towards more 
immigration in the second part of the 20th century. The Second Republic of Poland (1918–
1939) was a diverse state where around one third of the population might be characterised 
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as a religious and/or ethnic minority (Jasińska-Kania and Łodziński, 2009). After the 
Second World War, border changes and population displacements meant that Poland 
became largely homogeneous, both ethnically (Polish) and religiously (Roman Catholic). 
During the subsequent Socialist period (1945–1989, since 1952 as People’s Republic of 
Poland: Polska Republika Ludowa or PRL) achieving population homogeneity was an offi-
cial aim of the state as part of a nationalist ideology: a process facilitated by tight border 
controls and restrictions on free movement (Stola, 2010). The remaining Jewish popula-
tion, Catholic Church and LGBT population were all subject to persecution; consequently, 
ethnic and sexual minorities were largely absent from public life (Heinen, 1997).
In the years after 1989, freedom of movement and expression increased. As a result of 
accession to the European Union (EU; 1 May 2004) legislation was established to provide 
protection from discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, nationality and in part gen-
der and sexuality (Bojarski, 2011). Poland has also started to experience processes of indi-
vidualisation (Burrell, 2011), yet remains a relatively traditional society in which the Catholic 
Church has reasserted its influence following its prominent role in resisting the socialist state 
(Narkowicz, 2018; Requena and Stanek, 2013), and anti-equality movements in relation to 
gender and sexuality have gained more political power recently (Korolczuk and Graff, 2018).
After Poland signed the Geneva Convention in 1991, and an initial increase in antipa-
thy to refugees and immigrants among Poles, 2000–2014 could be described as a period 
of rather indifferent attitudes (Łodziński, 2017). During the Polish parliamentary elec-
tions in 2015, immigration issues were mobilised for the first time in an electoral cam-
paign, and have subsequently become a frequent topic in media and parliamentary 
debates (Narkowicz, 2018). Some authors point to a discursive shift ‘to a strong and 
forceful anti-immigrant rhetoric of discrimination or even outright hate toward migrants’ 
(Krzyżanowski, 2018: 76), which was strategically developed by the right-wing party 
Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [PiS], now the ruling party) to regain political 
power. Consequently, since 2015 opinion polls reveal a steep decrease in openness 
towards refugees: in May 2015 21% agreed that Poland should not accept refugees from 
regions with armed conflicts; in June 2018, 60% thought so (CBOS, 2018). The anti-
immigration discourse draws on longstanding feelings of cultural threat that immigrants 
could pose to the dominant Catholic values (Poland acting as a bulwark of Christian 
Europe) and to the vulnerable nation-state, which was previously in a precarious position 
(i.e. partitioned as a multi-ethnic state; Polynczuk-Alenius, 2020). Refugees were also 
orientalised and not perceived to be worthy of humanitarian help, and thus often pre-
sented as economic migrants (Narkowicz, 2018). This hardening of attitudes has been 
more pronounced among younger people; for example, in 2018, 8 out of 10 respondents 
aged 18–24 were against helping refugees originating from regions outside Europe 
(Narkowicz, 2018). In comparison to older people, younger Poles more often hold a mix 
of conservative-liberal values: conservative in terms of world-view about family life, 
low acceptance of minorities and preference for a strong leader, but liberal in terms of the 
economy and labour market (Winiewski et al., 2015). This could be a result of growing 
up in more uncertain economic and demographic contexts after 1989 (Mach, 2003).
Although our study was conducted before the so-called ‘migration crisis’ in 2015, 
attitudes are shaped over time and intergenerationally transmitted across decades. Pre-
2015 perspectives on cultural ‘otherness’ and how they were narrated have laid 
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foundations for the more recent hostility to some ethnic, racial or religious minorities and 
immigrants. Below we explain how a generational lens can be helpful in unpacking these 
processes in Poland.
The competing approaches to studying generations
Sociological enquiry into generations has grown from research where generations have 
been seen as fixed social categories. This stream of literature is informed by the influen-
tial work of Mannheim (1952), who argued that people born at a particular time and 
space encounter the same set of historical, cultural and political circumstances. These 
shared experiences shape their social and political values and some of these attitudes 
might persist over the life-course. Numerous studies from a range of academic traditions 
and international contexts have endorsed this analysis. For example, the work of Jennings 
and Niemi (1981) in American society demonstrated how political attitudes are shaped 
by formative political events of early youth, like participation in protests, and acquired 
norms and values persist over time.
However, such a compartmentalised concept of generation has been increasingly recog-
nised by sociological scholarship as too reductive and conflating it with a birth cohort. 
Already Mannheim (1952) observed that within one generation there are many ‘genera-
tional units’ comprising groups with distinct values and behaviours (Edmunds and Turner, 
2005). Other approaches have emerged in which generation is not conceived as a social 
category that can be ‘found’ in social life, but as a social construct, produced discursively 
or through relations (Bischoping and Gao, 2018; Foster, 2013a). The role of external fac-
tors and changes in the opportunity structures are not neglected, but the emphasis is on the 
relational nature of generations. Generations are not merely formed by ‘translating history 
in subjectivity’ or sharing similar moral and practical predispositions by being located in 
the same time-space (Aboim and Vasconcelos, 2014: 176). They are discursive formations 
– systems of meaning that shape thinking, understanding and experiencing; and different 
ways of speaking organising social relations (Grenier, 2007).
McDaniel (2004) has further argued that generations are not just systems of knowl-
edge, but rather knowledge systems are generationed. People ‘do generations’ in simi-
lar ways to how they ‘do gender’ or other forms of difference which are ‘constituted 
in the context of the differential “doings” of the others’ (West and Fenstermaker, 
1995: 32; West and Zimmerman, 1987). For example, as gender is performed in eve-
ryday life, and institutions and normative frames are gendered, the welfare and labour 
market regimes and within-family relations are also generationed (McDaniel, 2004). 
Generations are performed in everyday encounters, while navigating social reality, 
and their boundaries are reconfirmed or renegotiated while new generations emerge 
(McDaniel et al., 2013).
In this convention research has shown that individuals who belong to different gen-
erations form their social identities in relation to generational difference and through 
interactions with other age groups (Hopkins and Pain, 2007). Perspectives of ordinary 
people – in contrast to the ready categories devised and imposed by scholars – have 
been applied in studies of work relations in Canada (Foster, 2013a), social change in 
China (Bischoping and Gao, 2018) and intergenerational transfers in Canada and the 
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US (McDaniel et al., 2013). Together this strand of research has demonstrated that 
generational boundaries are not fixed, but constantly recreated, and generational divi-
sions might be drawn along multiple lines. However, such ‘narrative reiteration of 
intergenerational differences’ (Aboim and Vasconcelos, 2014: 176) might lead to 
strengthening generational identities, as both generations narratively build boundaries 
between each other. This might translate into the lack of intergenerational understand-
ing and ideological separation (Biggs, 2007).
Generational studies in Poland
During the socialist era, generations in Poland were typically identified in relation to 
important societal events, like the ‘1956 Generation’ (post-Stalin-death thaw), the ‘March 
1968 Generation’ (major student and intellectual protests) or the ‘1980 Generation’ (of the 
Solidarity movement) (Fatyga, 1999; Garewicz, 1983). Polish generational scholars argue 
that generations are not solely formed by these historical events, but by values, aspirations 
and attitudes developed in response to them (Fatyga, 1999). Likewise, the Polish sociolo-
gist Świda-Ziemba (2011), who extensively studied various cohorts of young people in the 
socialist period, demonstrated how their beliefs had a ‘radiating’ power in driving certain 
social and cultural processes during the communist era.
More recently, studies by Wrzesień (2009, 2016) have investigated values and cul-
tural practices of more narrowly defined generations, such as ‘Generation ’89’ (born 
1964–1970), ‘Children of Transformation’ (1971–1976) and ‘End of Century Whiners’ 
(1977–1982). Since 1989, the research on generations has been dominated by the explo-
ration of challenges young people face in the capitalist economy. Another study on the 
‘1989 generation’ in Poland (30-year-olds in 2000) demonstrated that they fared worse 
in the labour market than their peers in 1988 (30-year-olds in 1988), because of the 
uncertainty brought by economic transformation, which happened during a vulnerable 
stage of their lives, i.e. when they were making important life choices (Mach, 2003). In 
a similar manner, the recent work by Sawulski (2019) unpacks experiences of those born 
during the times of the systemic transformation, in the years 1986–1995, and – confus-
ingly – also labels them as ‘Generation ’89’.
How attitudes towards minority ethnic groups and immigrants vary by genera-
tions has not been – to the best of our knowledge – systematically studied in Poland. 
Our contribution to generational and wider sociological studies is thus threefold. 
First, many studies in Polish sociology have focused on narrowly defined genera-
tions, limited to specific birth cohorts, and described their lifestyles, values or socio-
economic status. Generationed responses to ethnic, religious and racial issues have 
not yet been considered. Second, most of these studies approached generations as 
fixed categories. We believe that by undertaking the relational approach to genera-
tions we will uncover the multi-layered nature of generational boundaries and incon-
sistencies in emerging narratives. It will help in understanding why some Poles 
believed (as of 2010–2014) that ethnic and racial prejudice was a problem of the 
past, not the future. Third, we contribute to sociological studies by using generation 
not merely as a descriptive category, but also as an analytical tool to understand 
societal transformations (Foster, 2013b).
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Research context and methods
The empirical material comes from a research conducted in Warsaw, Poland, as a part of a 
larger project: ‘Living with Difference in Europe: Making Communities out of Strangers in 
an Era of Super Mobility and Super Diversity’ (https://livedifference.group.shef.ac.uk/). 
Warsaw was selected because it is the most diverse and multicultural city in Poland. This 
was a mixed-method multi-stage project, with a sequential explanatory design (Creswell 
and Clark, 2017) starting with secondary data analysis and representative surveys in Leeds 
and Warsaw, followed by a few concurrent stages of qualitative research: individual and 
focus group interviews, observational and participatory methods. The analysis in this arti-
cle draws on the in-depth interviews. On the basis of preliminary analysis of the representa-
tive survey (see Piekut and Valentine, 2017), 30 people were recruited for the qualitative 
phase of the research. The participants were sampled to include those from a range of 
backgrounds, whose personal circumstances and lifestyle afforded them varying opportu-
nities to encounter ‘difference’, and to reflect the range of responses to the survey. Most 
interviewees were white and Polish, except a Latvian woman and a Polish-American man. 
The majority, 25 interviewees, self-identified as Catholic, three as not belonging to any 
religious group and two as Jewish and Orthodox respectively. Regarding the age of inter-
viewees, 11 participants were aged 18–34, 12 were 35–59 and seven over 60 years old. The 
split among genders was even, with one identifying as a gay man and one as a bisexual 
woman. Fifteen out of 30 were born in Warsaw, one abroad, and 14 came to live to Warsaw, 
usually as adults, from various regions in Poland. The Table A1 in the Appendix provides 
a fuller profile of each participant.
Each participant was interviewed three times in 2012–2013, approximately every three 
months. The first interview was a life story interview, where respondents shared childhood 
memories about their first encounters with difference. During the second interview we 
started with a reflection on meaningful events in participants’ lives, both private and histori-
cal events, which according to them might have had shaped their values and attitudes. The 
final interview focused on politics, current debates and changes in Polish society, so we 
could see what arguments interviewees use to account for and justify their social attitudes.1 
Interviews were repeated to build rapport between the participant and the researcher as the 
topics were often highly sensitive. The repetition meant that we could come back to difficult 
issues during later interviews, give an interviewee time between each meeting to reflect on 
the discussed topics, and finally, minimise the burden associated with interviewing.
The first named author, who is of Polish nationality, white female researcher, belong-
ing to the post-1989 generation (see below), conducted all interviews in Polish. They 
were transcribed and translated by an external company, then thematically coded in 
NVivo software. First, a set of predefined thematic codes was developed on the basis of 
interview cues, but also new categories were coded in vivo which were later reviewed 
and organised as new codes.
Generation-making narratives
Although generational divisions were not the main focus of our project, when analysing 
empirical material, we realised that our interviewees extensively employed a generational 
lens when reflecting on Polish society’s responses to difference. They used floating 
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signifiers to explain how they differ from their children/parents, such as ‘my generation’ 
or ‘younger/older generation’ (Bischoping and Gao, 2018), but also placed their experi-
ences in relation to meaningful historical events, like ‘before the War’, ‘in PRL/Socialism’ 
or ‘after 1989’. Guided by these self-identifications, we decided to divide participants into 
three broad generations: the ‘war’ (born until 1945), the ‘socialist’ (born 1946–1976) and 
the ‘post-1989’ generation (born 1977 onwards, which includes Polish ‘End of Century 
Whiners’ [born 1977–1983] and Generation Y [born after 1984]; Wrzesień, 2007).2 We 
recognise that these boundaries might be blurred or not necessarily overlap with our par-
ticipants’ perspectives.
Reflecting on the foundations of their values and how attitudes have been changing in 
Polish society, respondents justified them by referring to (1) changes in the political 
regime and related dominant normative systems, (2) the role of Catholicism and declin-
ing religiosity, and (3) new opportunity structures to encounter visible difference. The 
next sections unpack these three narratives that participants used in outlining boundaries 
between generations.
Generations produced in the past: The role of political regimes
In participants’ accounts, generation was framed as an axis of difference, as older and 
younger Poles were thought to possess fundamentally different attitudes towards other-
ness (Foster, 2013a; West and Fenstermaker, 1995), largely due to being socialised in 
different political regimes. The generation which was born before the Second World War 
was characterised by the youngest interviewees as more tolerant than the socialist gen-
eration. This pattern reflects what is commonly related to as the ‘myth of Polish toler-
ance’ in which multicultural, pre-war Poland is idealised as a time when diverse 
communities coexisted in harmony. This is in spite of a well-documented history of 
complex inter-ethnic relations during this period, including clashes between Polish and 
Ukrainian populations and evidence of discrimination towards Jewish people (Buchowski 
and Chlewińska, 2012). In contrast, the socialist era was characterised by post-1989 
participants as a period in which difference was suppressed or denied until the Iron 
Curtain fell, and Poland joined the EU. The pre-war period of cultural openness was 
believed to be followed by a more closed and self-focused socialist generation:
Supposedly Poland before the [Second World] War, particularly before the First World War, 
was really open. And people came, for example, to study at Jagiellonian University or Warsaw 
University from around the world. Poland also developed a lot in this direction, it was really 
open, I would say open to different types of diversity. Whether it is religious background, skin 
colour, and so on. It was just natural. No one would deny that after the end of the Second World 
War, under Communism, people really behaved in such a closed way. Everyone looked out only 
for themselves. (W8, M, Post-1989)
The perceived lack of tolerance of the socialist generation – especially by the post-
1989 generation – could be attributed to the fact that this generation was socialised in 
times when the communist authorities promoted a vision of an ethnically homogeneous 
state seen as a pivotal condition to achieve post-war stabilisation and justify the new 
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territorial shape of the country (Motyka, 2011). New normative frames were imposed 
onto the population in multiple reforms in 1948–1952, which introduced more social 
controls and the communist ideology into various life spheres, like the national education 
(Świda-Ziemba, 20113). The new frames were internalised by some participants from the 
socialist generations who perceived Polish society during socialism as more united, 
thanks to being more culturally homogeneous:
The so-called post-war generation, such as mine, and maybe five years after the war, this 
generation is the most united with each other, without other groups from the outside, because 
then there weren’t any such groups after the war – it was religion against communism. There 
was political struggle, the two camps were established, but Poland was united, there wasn’t just 
such a variety of differences. (W12, M, Socialist)
According to the literature, the socialist generation was conditioned by the regime’s 
dominant norms not to express or discuss otherness: the emphasis on conformity dis-
couraged the expression of any forms of difference; minorities experienced open dis-
crimination and became largely invisible in public life (Heinen, 1997); and those defined 
as ‘internal enemies’ were expelled (e.g. Jewish people; Copsey, 2008). This argument 
was also present in our participants’ narratives. Respondents from the socialist genera-
tion when asked about their memories of people who were different to them, explained 
that ‘in their times’ diversity, if it existed, was ‘hidden’:
We didn’t know, we only heard that something like this existed, but we didn’t know if it was 
among us. (W26, F, Socialist)
There was the Iron Curtain, so people were not allowed to go to the West, not allowed to see 
that there it is much better, and that progress is larger. On the contrary, the propaganda was that 
the Soviet Union only could pull us out of the hole. And that will help us, and so on. So, all in 
all the people didn’t discuss these issues. (W18, F, Socialist)
Those born in late 1970s onwards were the first generation that started their adult 
lives in a democratic country (i.e. post-1989), with the freedom of speech and expres-
sion. At the same time, the process of accession to the EU in 2004 brought the introduc-
tion of new equalities legislation (Bojarski, 2011), contributing to further change in the 
normative frames that people were operating within. This systematic change was also 
picked up by the youngest participants who argued that their generation is less prejudiced 
compared to the generation of their parents who were socialised under communism:
My peers and people from larger cities . . . for them it doesn’t matter who is what religion, what 
race . . . In the older [socialist] generation, people aged 60–63 . . . they categorise, stereotype 
. . . you can hear, when it comes to Jews, or other races that they are anti. They do not allow 
foreigners near them . . . My observation is that it is so ingrained in these people. It is still here, 
that era, that [socialist] system. I certainly think so, because they simply haven’t switched to 
what we have now, that it doesn’t matter what religion you are, what nationality. What is 
important is what you do in life . . . who you are, every day. Not where you came from . . . But 
that generation still has this categorisation [of difference] from previous years, the way they 
were brought up – and it is hard to just get over it somehow. (W15, M, Post-1989)
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Surprisingly, despite the transformation into the political system which meant difference 
could be openly discussed, the accounts of the youngest participants revealed that the 
contested topics of either past or current cultural diversity were largely absent from their 
family homes:
I remember my grandfather and my father never talked, for example, about politics. They never 
talked about religion. Once I heard they tried, and actually it was my father who ended the 
conversation with a quarrel. (W15, M, Post-1989)
My father is . . . an atheist, and my mum is a religious person. They had to live with that and 
somehow, I do not recall that they discussed any people of different religious views. (W7, F, 
Post-1989)
At home we never particularly talked about people who were of a different religion or had a 
different skin colour. It wasn’t specifically talked about and that’s maybe why I want to learn 
more. (W8, M, Post-1989)
As past studies have shown, the experiences of Poles after 1989 were marked by the 
post-socialist condition, which Stenning (2005) observed for labour market (im)mobili-
ties during the transformation in Poland. Our research adds to this by showing that such 
a condition persists also in the sphere of family relations and value transmission, and it 
manifests as not discussing ethnic or religious issues. Although both generations were 
depicted as different from one another, family home was not a space of discussing reli-
gious differences before and after 1989. Despite that, the changing nature of religiosity 
in Poland was another important boundary drawn between generations.
Generations moving through time: ‘Outdated’ Catholicism
Interviewees – both from the socialist and post-1989 generations – suggested that the 
changing nature of religious beliefs in the socialist Poland may account for the greater 
(perceived) levels of prejudice amongst older generations. Catholicism was strengthened 
during the socialist era because the Catholic Church was a key opponent of the Communist 
government (Borowik, 2002). Some argued therefore that the strong adherence to the 
Catholic faith during this period may account in part for their perceived lack of tolerance, 
particularly towards other faiths:
I think because Poland is a Catholic country, though not anymore so. I think that among older 
and middle generations this view was established after the Second World War, when Socialism 
was introduced, when resistance couldn’t be expressed because of the threat of sanctions. The 
Catholic faith was the mainstay, a weapon to survive. . . . As a child I had the impression that 
it was emphasized that the Catholic religion is better than other [religions] . . . And I just got 
the impression that the Polish Pope changed this approach, instilled a respect for other religions. 
(W23, F, Socialist)
The above reflection implies that the post-1989 generation might have become more 
tolerant due to the changing nature of Polish Catholicism. The youngest generation was 
socialised when John Paul II, a Polish national himself, was the Pope/Head of the 
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Catholic Church between 1978 and 2005. According to Ruszkowski et al. (2006), his 
teaching and ecumenical work played a significant role in shaping values and religious 
attitudes among Poles who grew up during his pontificate, to the extent that the term 
‘JPII generation’ was coined in public debates. Conversely, younger participants often 
claimed that the greater and rigid religiosity of the socialist generations has laid founda-
tions for their exclusionary and stereotypical views:
Only lately has Poland become more internationally open . . . But there are quite a lot of people 
who grew up and were raised in Poland under communism and that also has great significance. 
Because these are the very people who are quite parochial, they have some idiotic views. For 
example, that all Muslims are terrorists. I stubbornly try to explain to them that it’s not religion 
that kills, only people . . . There are Catholics and the extreme Catholics [PL: katole] who will 
sit in the Old Town, . . . and dance around the cross. (W8, M, Post-1989)
Religious people from the socialist generation were depicted by the post-1989 genera-
tion as more often holding distinct political views and ‘outdated’ ways of behaving, such as 
openly manifesting their religiousness in marches or praying in public. The above respond-
ent referred to the gatherings in front of the Presidential Palace, where some Poles would 
meet on the 10th of every month to commemorate the Smoleńsk plane crash on 10 April 
2010.4 Interestingly, the generational line around the religiosity axis was not clear cut – 
some participants would relate higher religiosity with the socialist generation, while others 
with even older people. For example, a respondent born in the mid-1950s reflected:
So, all those ‘moherówki’ [‘mohair berets’ – see below]. . . . This generation older than me, it 
seems to me that they are all completely confused, and they do not understand the difference 
between this and that, but a priest said ‘This is wrong’ and [they believed] this is wrong. (W16, 
F, Socialist)
Religious people from the war and the socialist generations were often associated 
with the Radio Maryja movement (led by a Redemptorist Father Tadeusz Rydzyk), which 
supports PiS, propagates ‘national-Catholic ideology’, and spreads xenophobic views 
against the official teaching of the Polish Catholic Church (Krzemiński, 2017). They 
were described by younger participants as less pro-European, and in general more preju-
diced than younger people:
I have nothing against Father Rydzyk and Radio Maryja, but in certain situations, sometimes 
during their marches, they behave like a sect. I am a Catholic, yet they manifest some extreme, 
some old way of thinking. They surely are not pro-European, but the other way around. And I 
reckon that we should get rid of this way of thinking, we should be open to otherness, to the 
West, to Europe. You cannot be narrow-minded and reject others. (W30, M, Post-1989)
It happened that participants from the post-1989 generation used pejorative terms, 
such as ‘katol’ [from Polish Katolik] or ‘mohair berets’ [PL: moherowe berety], to 
describe older, more religious persons. The latter is used to label people (usually female) 
who support the Radio Maryja movement. The term ‘mohair beret’ intersects ageism and 
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religious prejudice, which among some younger people manifested as a belief that the 
older generations hold irrational political views, engage in ‘outdated’ or backwards reli-
gious activities, and do not fit with a modern, Europe-facing Poland. These are all char-
acteristics implicitly associated with ageism, when older people are stereotyped as being 
rigid in thought, slow to change, and old-fashioned in terms of their moral dispositions 
(Bytheway, 2005).
In this section we have seen that the generational boundaries are temporally rela-
tional. According to the accounts of participants, generations like the war generation 
have become more prejudiced due to living through socialism, and like the socialist 
generation they had a specific Catholic religiosity instilled in them during this period. In 
socialism, religious events often blurred with anti-state demonstrations (Borowik, 2002), 
and the post-1989 generation perceived such mixing of politics and religious practice as 
an outdated practice of the past.
Generations moving through space: Visible difference
When reflecting on why different generations might hold dissimilar opinions about ethnic 
and religious minorities, participants also argued that limited possibilities to encounter oth-
erness during socialism, either at home or overseas, could be another reason. This line of 
reasoning was based on an assumption that more opportunities to meet, work with and have 
friends of a non-Polish background have led to more favourable views on minorities among 
younger Poles. Our analysis based on a survey conducted with participants from the same 
project confirmed this – more everyday interactions with people who are perceived to be of 
a dissimilar ethnic background are associated with more tolerant attitudes to them (Piekut 
and Valentine, 2017). Moreover, the lives of the youngest generation are not bound by 
national boundaries, as lives of older generations were; they extend beyond one national 
setting, and are more influenced by the processes of European integration and globalisa-
tion, as well as by international media (Edmunds and Turner, 2005; Vandegrift, 2016).
Poles born in the late 1970s and early 1980s were the first generation in Poland inten-
tionally investing in international mobility, participating in the Erasmus programme and 
overseas internships, and as such are described as ‘European seekers’ (Wrzesień, 2009), 
the ‘generation of the EU’ or ‘generation Erasmus’ (Andrejczuk, 2017).
Socialist Poland was for most citizens ‘a country with no exit’, and a country of 
almost no immigration to Poland (Stola, 2010). For the socialist generation the sudden 
increase in non-Polish residents in Warsaw after 1989 resulted in misunderstandings or 
discomfort due to problems in communication. Interestingly, the accounts of the young-
est participants about their first visits abroad to some extent mirror the reflections made 
by the socialist generation about demographic changes they observed in Warsaw after 
1989. Notably, contrary to the socialist generation, the Polish youth having gained expe-
rience of Western societies and grown up in more globalised times, did not perceive 
Warsaw as so culturally diverse. The first quote below comes from a participant in her 
fifties who never lived abroad, while the second is from a 20-year-old student, who 
worked for a few months in England:
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Warsaw is a strange city, there are a lot of foreigners. Sometimes, I wonder whether I am in a 
foreign country. Because when you walk the streets, apart from the Polish [language], you can 
only hear [foreign] languages. But our youth is talented now, as far as languages are concerned, 
they speak many languages, not only one. Well, but us, old people, we grew up in those 
[different] times. (W18, F, Socialist)
[In England] [t]here are more people from other countries, a complete cultural mix that, really, 
wherever you go, you can encounter – I don’t know, at least 10 different nationalities in the 
store or in the pub, or wherever. But here [in Warsaw] when someone on the tram is speaking 
some other language, then everyone looks in their direction . . . because a tourist is talking on 
the tram. (W4, F, Post-1989)
Participants specifically reflected that PRL provided less opportunities to encounter 
visible difference in public space. In a ‘nationally, ethnically, racially and religiously 
non-heterogeneous Polish society’ the visual phenotypical difference of immigrants from 
African or Asian countries resulted in racialised perceptions (Vieten and Gawlewicz, 
2016: 211). As visible ethnic difference in public spaces has become more commonplace 
after 1989, older generations believed that younger people have been developing more 
progressive attitudes towards minorities, and the presence of visible minorities has 
become normalised (Piekut et al., 2014). In contrast, their own first encounters with non-
white people remained vivid in their memories:
I remember, when I was a child and I saw a Black person [PL: Murzyna] . . . I was young . . . 
nine, ten, eleven years old. ‘Oh, a Black guy’ [PL: Murzyn], there was even ridiculing on trams 
‘Oh, Murzyn Bambo’.5 And now, maybe there is generally tolerance towards different people 
. . . Back then, in the 1980s, to meet a black person [PL: Murzyna] in the street it was rare, it 
virtually didn’t happen, I didn’t have an [opportunity]. Now it’s normal. (W30, M, Socialist)
It used to be, for example, that when a Black guy [PL: Murzyn] came to Poland, heads would 
turn. At this moment, heads don’t turn anymore for a Black guy [PL: Murzyn]. . So, I reckon 
our children, for their generation, this is how is going to be, unless something drastic happens 
politically speaking, because politicians know how to set nations at odds. (W12, M, Socialist)
Yet, some stereotypical and negative words, like ‘Murzyn’ (Ząbek, 2007), were commonly 
used by participants irrespective of age. Many Poles do not realise the racialised undertone 
of the term (Gawlewicz, 2016), and for example, for one respondent in his thirties, who had 
some Black friends, the term was related to Africa as a region: ‘if we were living in Africa, 
we would have been dark too, unless this was South Africa, the white Murzyni’. Another 
interviewee from the post-1989 generation recalled her first memories as a student in 
England, and she also used the contested term ‘Murzyn’ to refer to Black people there. As 
Polish nationality is inclusive to whiteness (Balogun, 2018), in her account the darker skin 
tone was more broadly associated with being non-European and non-English:
I was in England . . . I went to a college, that was the first time it really hit me, I didn’t expect such 
diversity there . . . Because the skin colour is the first thing you see – that there are just people 
from practically the whole world. Well, and I didn’t expect that at all [laughter]. For example, you 
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can go to a fast-food place, and English people don’t work there at all. I mean . . . white people, 
at all. I didn’t meet any at all. Everywhere either Indians or someone from Pakistan and so on, or 
Black people [PL: Murzyni]. That was a big shock for me. (W4, F, Post-1989)
The above narratives uncover that generations indeed operate as systems of meaning 
underpinning perceptions of difference (Grenier, 2007; McDaniel, 2004). At the same 
time, a similarity between the socialist and post-1989 generations unfolded in the inter-
views: after 1989 both of them had to learn how to live in a more diverse context – either 
in Poland or internationally – than the society where they were socialised in. This simi-
larity-in-difference demonstrates how encounters with immigrants and visibly different 
minorities are generationed, as both generations use different points of reference to make 
sense of increasing diversity in the contemporary Poland. The socialist generation relates 
their contemporary experiences to the ethnically homogeneous, socialist Poland, while 
for the younger, more Europe-facing generation, the still modest level of cultural diver-
sity in post-1989 Poland is not seen as real diversity. Despite that, some stigmatising 
terms, like ‘Murzyn’, have been transmitted across generations, and are used in more 
diverse, supposedly more tolerant times.
Conclusions
In this article, we have applied a relational lens to illustrate how generations in Poland 
perceive each other and narratively construct boundaries between each other (Aboim and 
Vasconcelos, 2014; Hopkins and Pain, 2007; Vanderbeck and Worth, 2015). Instead of 
compartmentalising generations, we turned to arguments developed by our participants 
to understand why different generations might hold dissimilar attitudes towards people 
of minority ethnicity, race or religion. Generations were narrated as a form of difference, 
which defines behaviours and attitudes in various spheres of life (West and Fenstermaker, 
1995), including the ways people ascribed to various generations were expected to inter-
act with and feel about minorities. Participants of various age believed that the youngest, 
post-1989 generation is more respectful and open towards minority ethnic or religious 
groups, because they grew up in a society without political repressions, but in a country 
preserving the freedoms of speech, expression and movement, and where they have more 
everyday encounters with visible diversity.
Although generations were narrated as axes of difference, the boundaries between 
them were not clear-cut. On the one hand, generations were narrated as a product of past 
experience - being born and socialised in a specific normative framework. This under-
standing resembles the classic definition where a generation is conceived as a social 
category, whose values develop in response to influential political or economic events. 
On the other hand, our participants’ reflections – concerning attitudes to people of a dif-
ferent ethnicity, race or religion – have also revealed that generational boundaries are 
relational and re-negotiated, and as generations move through time and space, they 
change their points of reference. We did not have space in this article to delve into the 
complexity of cultural diversity in Poland, nor the specificity of Warsaw, and we are 
aware that attitudes of Poles towards various minorities vary. Yet, the evidence coming 
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from our analysis indicates that the generational boundaries were being re-drawn along 
the contested lines of Catholic religiosity and the visibility of minorities. As such, the 
boundaries of generations are constructed around common knowledge and values, not 
around fixed membership in the community (Yuval-Davis, 2010), and generational affili-
ations constitute an important part of social identities (Hopkins and Pain, 2007).
The generational perspective might offer an appealing, comforting narrative in times 
of new challenges and growing uncertainty (White, 2013), like those associated with 
increased international migration. In the presented case, both the socialist and post-1989 
generations believed that the political transition, accompanied by more immigrant 
inflows, had translated into more acceptance among the cohorts which grew up after 
1989. Such positive self-perception of the post-1989 generation may obscure the recog-
nition of their own intolerances – towards various minorities, including older generations 
which they try to differentiate from – because of an illusive belief in progress made in 
comparison to the older generations. This might provide some explanation why the nar-
ratives about growing openness to immigration (as made by our participants in 2012–
2013) are in stark contrast with the change in public discourse after the so-called 
‘migration crisis’ in 2015–2016, which has become more openly anti-immigrant, specifi-
cally anti-Muslim and against the ‘racialized Other’ in Poland (Jaskułowski and Pawlak, 
2020; Krzyżanowski, 2018; Narkowicz, 2018).
The application of the generational frameworks might pose another challenge: they 
often mask diversity within, or similarities between generations (White, 2013). While 
our participants argued in favour of many differences between the socialist and post-
1989 generations, we found commonalities across age groups, such as refraining from 
talking about ethnic and religious otherness in a family setting and sensationalising vis-
ible difference (e.g. of Black bodies). This highlights the urgent need for more research 
on intergenerational transmission of memories and values related to cultural otherness in 
Poland, which might help in improving our understanding of why the anti-immigration 
rhetoric has become more salient recently.
We would like to conclude by pointing to the contribution of our study for sociologi-
cal studies. Thanks to viewing generation not as a descriptive, but as an analytical cate-
gory (Foster, 2013b), our analysis demonstrated that generational boundaries are blurred, 
and are temporally and spatially relational. Generation-related identities mean different 
things to different generations and focusing on generation-making narratives allows to 
unpack their contextualised meanings. Like class or gender relations, generational rela-
tions could be used in sociological studies in other countries to understand generation-
specific power relations, and their consequences for other kinds of difference or wider 
social inequalities.
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Notes
1. A copy of the interview cues in English and Polish is available upon request from the authors.
2. As Wrzesień (2007, 2009) explains, Generation X in Poland does not overlap with the cohorts 
classified as Generation X in the West, and it spans birth years 1964–1983.
3. The changes in national education involved introducing a new programme and textbooks for 
schools, moving teachers across schools to break down existing social ties, and all school 
principals had to belong to the ruling party (Świda-Ziemba, 2011).
4. Ninety-six people died in the crash, including Polish President Lech Kaczynski (twin brother 
of the Law and Justice leader, Jarosław) and his wife Maria, senior governmental officials, 
military and clergy, and 18 members of the parliament.
5. A Polish poem for children written by Julian Tuwim in 1920s entitled ‘Murzynek Bambo’, 
which could be translated into ‘Bambo the little Black boy’ or ‘Bambo the Nigrette’, present-
ing the black boy as a ‘joyful little savage-kid’ (Gawlewicz, 2016: 36).
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Résumé
Dans cet article, nous nous éloignons de l’approche des générations en tant que catégories 
statiques pour mieux étudier comment les gens ordinaires (à la différence des spécialistes) 
distinguent les générations et justifient leurs différentes réactions face à la diversité culturelle 
en matière d’appartenance ethnique, de race et de religion ou de convictions. Notre analyse 
s’appuie sur 90 entretiens approfondis avec 30 habitants de la capitale polonaise, Varsovie (2012-
2013). En abordant la génération comme une catégorie analytique, nous identifions divers récits 
de différenciation que les participants à l’étude ont employés pour tracer des frontières entre 
les générations, renforçant l’idée répandue selon laquelle, parmi les Polonais, la jeune génération 
est plus ouverte à la diversité. Bien que les générations soient considérées comme l’axe autour 
duquel s’articulent les différences – conditionnant les réactions spécifiques à chaque génération 
face à la diversité – les récits émergeant des entretiens révèlent leur caractère relationnel, ainsi 
que des similitudes et des points de rencontre entre leurs expériences. 
Mots-clés
Diversité culturelle, génération, Pologne, préjugés, tolerance
Resumen
Este artículo se aleja del enfoque que analiza las generaciones como categorías estáticas y explora 
cómo la gente corriente, a diferencia de los académicos, distingue las generaciones y justifica sus 
diferentes respuestas ante la diversidad cultural en términos de etnia, raza y religión o creencias. 
El análisis se basa en 90 entrevistas en profundidad con 30 habitantes de la capital polaca, Varsovia 
(2012-2013). Al abordar la generación como una categoría analítica, se identifican varias narrativas 
diferenciadoras, que los participantes del estudio emplearon para trazar divisorias entre las 
generaciones, reforzando la creencia común de que los polacos más jóvenes son los que más 
aceptan la diversidad. Aunque las generaciones son vistas como el eje en torno al que se originan 
las diferencias, condicionando las respuestas específicas de cada generación ante la diversidad, 
los relatos que surgen de las entrevistas revelan su naturaleza relacional, así como similitudes y 
puntos de conexión entre sus experiencias. 
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Table A1. Demographic profiles of research participants.
Code Gender Birth year (age during the study) Nationality Religion Place of birth Work status & occupation
W1 Female Born 1950s (55–59) Polish Catholic Warsaw, Poland Health care worker
W2 Male 1990 (22) Polish Catholic Town, north-eastern Poland Student
W3 Female 1987 (25) Polish Catholic Town, north-eastern Poland Student + Part-time job
W4 Female 1991 (21) Polish Catholic Warsaw, Poland Student
W5 Male 1982 (30) Polish Catholic Village, southern Poland Own business
W6 Male 1981 (31) Polish Catholic Warsaw, Poland Construction worker
W7 Female 1992 (20) Polish Atheist Warsaw, Poland Student
W8 Male 1987 (25) Polish Catholic Warsaw, Poland Salesman
W9 Male 1968 (44) Polish Catholic Warsaw, Poland Insurance company
W10 Female 1989 (23) Polish Catholic Town, northern Poland Student + Part-time job
W11 Male 1991 (22) Polish Atheist Town, north-eastern Poland Student
W12 Male 1949 (64) Polish & American Catholic Village, south-western Poland Businessman, inventor
W13 Male 1970 (43) Polish Catholic Warsaw, Poland Driver
W14 Female 1946 (67) Polish Catholic Town, eastern Poland Retired
W15 Male 1983 (30) Polish Jewish City, central Poland Adviser, cash office
W16 Female 1956 (57) Polish Catholic Warsaw, Poland Long-term sick / disabled
W17 Female 1955 (58) Polish Catholic Warsaw, Poland Cloakroom
W18 Female 1951 (62) Polish Catholic Warsaw, Poland Technical analyst
W19 Male 1971 (42) Polish Catholic Warsaw, Poland Settlement analyst
W20 Female 1937 (76) Polish Catholic Pre-war Poland Retired
W21 Male 1938 (75) Polish Catholic City, eastern Poland Retired
W22 Male 1975 (38) Polish Catholic Town, southern Poland Translator
W23 Female 1963 (50) Polish Catholic Town, southern Poland Accountant, manager
W24 Male 1978 (35) Polish Catholic Warsaw, Poland Electrician
W25 Female 1984 (29) Latvian Orthodox Not in Poland Translator
W26 Female 1961 (52) Polish Catholic Town, south-eastern Poland Unemployed
W27 Male 1947 (66) Polish Catholic Village, southern Poland Government agency specialist
W28 Female 1961 (52) Polish Catholic Warsaw, Poland Medical technician
W29 Female 1976 (37) Polish Atheist Warsaw, Poland Translator, teacher
W30 Male 1977 (36) Polish Catholic Warsaw, Poland Estate guard
